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McGinn on delusion and imagination
We admire the freshness and audacity of McGinn’s book on the imagination. We
disagree with him about the relation between delusion and imagery. McGinn’s thesis
raises a more general issue about the relation between delusion, belief and imagination;
we discuss this at the end of our paper.
McGinn argues that delusions are “imagination-driven beliefs” (p.113), caused by mental
images: particularly, it seems, visual and auditory images. According to this thesis
delusions arise in two ways. The subject may form a belief based on the image, much in
the way a healthy belief might be formed on the basis of perceptual experience.
Delusions may also be caused by perceptions suffused with imaginings, as when one
hears—genuinely hears—a conversation and hears it as a conspiracy. It is the
contribution of imagination to perception that causes the delusion in this case; without
this contribution, the perception itself would not sustain the belief in a conspiracy (p.115).
That there is some connection between imagery and delusions is highly probable. The
question is whether we can identify a special, explanatory relation between imagery and
delusions, given that imagery is, for many people at least, a common feature of mental
life, accompanying, provoking and modulating perfectly healthy thoughts, emotions and
actions. Imagery also seems to play a role in many aspects of psychopathology,
including those where delusions are not prominent: substance misuse, phobias,
depression.1 What is McGinn telling us of particular relevance to the understanding of
delusions? We take a central part of his thesis to be this: delusions are standardly
thought to be caused by hallucinations; but this arises out of a confused understanding
of the distinction between hallucinations and mental images; when we look at the
phenomenology of delusional mental disorders, we shall see that it is mental images that
are the real cause.
One more point of interpretation: McGinn says that his interest is in “the characterization
of the delusions of madness” (p.115), suggesting that his claim is not meant to apply to
absolutely all possible cases of delusion. At the same time, he would seem to be
committed to something stronger than the claim that delusions in psychopathology are
sometimes caused by images. If it is characteristic of the delusions of madness to be
caused by imagery, we would expect that they are mostly so caused, or at least that they
are so caused except in cases which fail some independent test of normality. But both
these claims are wrong. They are wrong for two reasons. First, where experiences often
described as ‘hallucinations’ do play a significant causal role in delusion-generation,
these experiences don’t have some of the features necessary for them to count, by
McGinn’s lights, as images. Secondly, there is a large, clinically central class of
delusions which cannot plausibly be accounted for on the assumption that either imagery
or hallucination has taken over or supplemented the causal role we would otherwise
expect to be occupied by healthy perception. Since these weaker claims are wrong, any
stronger claim about a necessary connection between delusion and imagery must be
wrong also.
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12(4), (2004), and Morrison, A.P., Beck A.T. et al (2002). ‘Imagery and psychotic symptoms: a
preliminary investigation’. Behaviour Research and Therapy 40(9): 1053-1062.
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What hangs on the claim that delusions are caused by images rather than by
hallucinations? As McGinn notes, the distinction that he wants to draw between images
and hallucinations is not generally reflected in the clinical literature (p.187), so those who
speak of hallucinations as the causes of delusions are not necessarily disagreeing with
him. But the issue is not one merely of labelling. McGinn offers an account (Chapter 1)
of the characteristics of images which distinguish them from what he calls hallucinations:
the substantive part of his claim is that delusions are caused by states with those
characteristics, regardless of what we call them. We discuss some of these
characteristics later on. But it is important to be clear about one thing from the start.
While McGinn, in company with others, cites dependence on the will as characteristic of
imagining, he also says that when images cause delusions, those images are not felt by
the subject to be dependent on the will; rather, the image is controlled by an
unconscious component of his mind (p.118). The idea of a loss of the sense of agency is
important, and we will come back to it.
We now turn to the details of McGinn’s claim about the characteristics of delusion-
causing states.
*
McGinn says that his is not a “full” account of delusions (p.187). But without some
specification of the limits of this account, which he does not give us, it seems appropriate
to treat the hypothesis as one with full psychiatric generality; only that way can we gauge
what its limitations are. We begin with psychotic delusions. Later we consider delusions
of other kinds.
The one specific cause of delusion mentioned by McGinn is “be[ing] visited by auditory
images that have persecutory content” (p.115). McGinn is referring here to what would
normally be described as auditory hallucinations, suffered by about 70% of patients with
schizophrenia: this is the most common symptom of that complex disorder or group of
disorders. We can agree that such experiences (whatever we call them) can contribute
to the formation of certain delusions; patients have these experiences and form beliefs
such as that they are being spoken to by powerful and often threatening agents. The
question is whether these experiences have the characteristics McGinn associates with
imagery.
McGinn joins with Jaspers in saying that these experiences “appear in inner subjective
space”, rather than seeming to emanate from interpersonal space; this is crucial to their
being, in McGinn’s view, images rather than hallucinations (p.117). Empirical evidence
suggests that this is not universally the case. Several studies have found that patients
describe their voices as emanating from extrapersonal space about as often as they
describe them as located within the head; some patients experience them at both loci,
variably.2 One study compared the experiences of patients with tinnitus with those of
patients with schizophrenia. While the majority of those with tinnitus experienced sound
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2 Holland J.A., Riley K.C. (1998).  ‘Characterizing auditory hallucinations: an aid in the differential
diagnosis of malingering’ Journal of the American Association of Emergency Psychiatry 4(1): 3-5;
Nayani T.H., David A.S. (1996). ‘The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological survey’.
Psychological Medicine 26: 177–89; Copolov, D. Trauer, T and McKinnon, A. (2004). 'On the
non-significance of internal versus external auditory hallucinations’. Schizophrenia Research 69:
1-6.
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as coming from within the head, the majority of schizophrenic patients (11 out of 14)
experienced voices as coming from outside the head.3 McGinn claims that patients who
hear voices do not behave as they would if their voices seemed to come from
extrapersonal space; the subject does not, for example, “incline his head in the direction
of the supposed voice” (p.116). Our discussions with clinicians in this area suggests
otherwise: patients do sometimes turn towards the perceived location of the sound, and
we are told of a case where a patient raised the shoulder of his coat to his ear, to help in
blocking out the sound. All of the ‘external’ hallucinators reported in Nayani and David
(1996) were able to locate the sound in space.
Should we say that at least those voices which are experienced as originating within the
subject’s head are to count, by McGinn’s lights, as images rather than hallucinations? In
his account of the hallucination/imagery distinction, McGinn makes a lot of the supposed
fact that images do not purport to tell us how things are in relation to our bodies.
Focusing on the visual case, he says that while perceived or hallucinated objects are felt
to be in a definite relation to the body, and in particular to the eyes, a visual image does
not present its object as in any such relation (p.23). There is an auditory version of this
thesis: perceived sounds present themselves as having a source which is in some, often
vague, relation to the body, while imaged sounds do not. But at least some voices
described as ‘within the head’ present themselves as bearing a spatial relation to the
body, in virtue of being, exactly, within the head. Nearly all the internal hallucinators
reported in Nayani and David (1996) were able to locate their ‘voices’ exactly within their
own head or body (typically in the forehead). Where ‘voices’ can be located so precisely,
there is little to support the idea that these are cases of imagination rather than
hallucination, as McGinn divides the territory.4
A friend of McGinn’s thesis might respond by saying that, at most, this suggests that
auditory images do not have all the characteristics McGinn ascribes to them, and that we
have done nothing to show that there are delusions in which imagery plays no significant
role. We agree; the fact that the experience of hearing voices is an experience which
carries with it information about spatial location should not make us rule out the
possibility that such experiences have an imagistic character. After all, McGinn, in
company with others, cites dependence on the will as a characteristic of imagining.
Recall that he also says that when images cause delusions, those images are no longer
experienced as dependent on the will; rather, the image is controlled by an unconscious
component of the subject’s mind (p.118). For all we know, loss of the sense that an
image depends on the will may bring with it other peculiarities; it might have the effect of
making images seem to carry with them information about spatial location. Perhaps an
argument could then be mounted for saying that what makes the experience of hearing
voices an imagistic one, despite some significant differences between the
phenomenology of hearing voices and the phenomenology of (ordinary) imagery, is the
fact that the experience of hearing voices is explicable in terms of the operation of
mechanisms which normally produce (ordinary) images, but here malfunction to produce
the experience of hearing voices.
For present purposes, we take no stand on this one way or another. Our point so far is a
limited one: McGinn can’t use his account of the characteristics of images to argue that
hearing voices in psychosis is a phenomenon of imagery as distinct from hallucination,
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 Johns, L.C., Hemsley, D. and Kuipers, E. (2002). ‘A comparison of auditory hallucinations in a
psychiatric and non-psychiatric group’ British Journal of Clinical Psychology 41: 81–6.
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 We are indebted, here and in the previous paragraph, to Professor Peter Liddle.
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for at least some heard voices do not have those characteristics. But we now argue for
something stronger: that many delusions in psychosis derive from experiences which,
while strange in various ways, are not in any significant way experiences of imagery.
They are sometimes experiences of loss of agency, and sometimes experiences with a
particular affective character, that of ‘meaningfulness’.
Recall McGinn’s idea that imagery in psychosis is not experienced as willed by the
subject. Loss of a sense of one’s own agency seems to be a common feature of
psychosis. It is common for patients to claim a loss of capacity to act, and a
corresponding subservience of the will to that of another; patients claim that some other
person causes their bodies to move, or they report that thoughts are inserted into or
removed from their own minds by others. It is thought that the explanation for this is not
so much actual loss of control, but, in part, a loss of the sense of control. This loss of
perceived control occurs with bodily movements, but also with the generation of thought,
leading patients to say that their thoughts are controlled by others. In cases of these
kinds patients form delusional ideas--that their movements, or their thoughts, or their
speech are controlled by external agents--which seem not to arise from imagery or from
hallucinatory perception, but at least in part from the patient’s perceived lack of agency.
Also significant for the generation of delusions in schizophrenia is what is sometimes
called ‘delusional mood’, a phenomenon accompanying the onset of psychotic episodes.
Delusional mood is best described as a kind of experience, though not a perceptual one;
otherwise ordinary events and objects seem to be deeply meaningful in ways that are
not yet clarified, it is as though everything is a sign, though it is not clear what things are
signs of. Delusions produced by delusional mood seem to be specific hypotheses about
what this mysterious meaning is. Again, these delusions are the product, not of imagery,
but a sense of inchoate meaningfulness.
But might not imagery play some role in the generation even of these sorts of delusions?
Yes. For example, imagery might play a role in mediating between delusional mood and
specific delusional ideas. As Davies and colleagues put it “when a subject experiences
these feelings of significance, an apparently significant train of thought and its
associated imagery come to provide content for a delusional belief.“5 But—to recall an
earlier point—if imagery plays a mediating role here, it does not seem to be different in
kind from the role we would expect imagery to play in the generation of quite benign
beliefs; we often confront puzzling situations and generate hypotheses to explain them,
and imagery may make certain hypotheses more salient than others; this does not make
the beliefs thus generated delusional.
We earlier undertook to apply McGinn’s theory to non-psychotic delusions. There is, for
example, a range of bizarre delusions associated with specific brain lesions of various
kinds and which are notable for being monothematic. These delusional states appear to
be caused by unusual experiences, but once again, these cannot be explained as
involving images that substitute for or enrich perception. Some of these experiences are
emotional rather than perceptual in kind. Ellis and Young argue that the Capgras
delusion—in which people claim that their loved ones have been replaced by robots or
aliens of similar appearance—arises because the subject, through brain damage, no
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 Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. and Breen, N. (2001).  ‘Monothematic delusions: towards
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longer experiences the emotions that the sight of a familiar face normally brings.6 With
the Fregoli delusion we find unusually heightened emotional response to faces, even
unfamiliar ones, leading the subject to conclude that people they know well are spying
on them in heavy disguise. The Cotard delusion—the delusion that one is dead, or
sometimes ’undead’—may be associated with generally much reduced affect.7
Once again, we do not deny that some form of imagination may play a role in these
cases. Perhaps the affective changes encourage one to imagine that one’s partner has
been replaced by a double, or that someone familiar to you is watching you in disguise.
This may be one way to understand McGinn’s claim about the imaginative interpretation
of perception, though it seems to have little to do with imagery per se. But we say again:
in such a case, imagination does not seem to be playing any special role. In any case
where we formulate a hypothesis, the idea starts as something we imagine, assume or
suppose, only later (though perhaps not very much later) becoming a belief. In this
sense there is nothing pathological about an imagining that leads to a belief.
*
McGinn says that his view has the advantage that it enables us to keep  sight of the
irrationality of delusions: it is irrational to have your  beliefs driven by your images, but
there would be nothing irrational  about having your beliefs driven by your hallucinatory
experiences; it  is just bad luck that you have such grossly misleading experiences
(pp.115-6). But delusions caused by hallucinatory experiences will not automatically
count as rational: the rational response to an experience which is in massive and
obvious conflict with what one already believes, and with the opinions of other reliable
people, would be to regard the experience as non-veridical. To the claim that this
objection under-rates the power of experience to “drag” belief with it, it may be replied
that people sometimes do have very unusual experiences without forming delusional
beliefs on their basis. People with phantom limb experiences after amputation do not
generally believe that they have invisible limbs, or limbs that are present only when they
are not looking at or touching  them; they accept that their very vivid, detailed and
continuous  proprioceptive experiences are simply non veridical. People also have
unusual absences of experience—particularly relevant to the case of schizophrenia, as
we have seen—without becoming delusional. Patients with anarchic-hand syndrome,
where one hand behaves, apparently, as if it is not under the control of the agent, do not
generally believe that their hand is being controlled by mysterious and powerful agents.
Even those subject to full-blown hallucinations sometimes display insight, and do not
believe in the reality of their visions.8
Even where a delusion results from a genuine perceptual experience, it may be so
evidentially underfunded by the experience that its irrationality is manifest. Consider the
often-cited example of the patient who formed the delusional view that the world was
about to end. One can imagine experiences, hallucinatory or otherwise, which would
make this a rational thing to believe—one might have heard (or seemed to have heard)
that a large meteor is about to hit the Earth. But this patient—who formed the delusion
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 See Manford, M. and Andermann, F. (1998). ‘Complex visual hallucinations: clinical and
neurobiological insights’. Brain 121:1819-1840.
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on the basis of looking at marble table tops—had no experience which came anywhere
near playing this justificatory role. Someone wondering whether this patient’s belief is
rational or not would be looking in the wrong place if they thought that the question could
be settled by deciding whether the patient really saw, or hallucinated the marble table
top, or instead had a visual image as of a marble table top.  The same applies in a case
mentioned by McGinn; that of hearing a conversation as a conspiracy. McGinn says this
is an example of perception suffused with imagery. But the problem need not be that
imagery is interfering with perception--the patient might not disagree with anyone else
about the words spoken. Rather, there is a tendency on the subject’s part to interpret
what is said as meaning something conspiratorial and threatening, though the rest of us
would probably find the supposed connection between what was said and this meaning
scarcely intelligible. Such occasions of hearing a conversation as a conspiracy, or
seeing a stranger’s stare as threatening, or an everyday scene as a sign of the end of
the world, seem to involve what John Campbell calls “top down loading” of perception
from the contents of the patients thoughts about conspiracies and secret meanings,
rather than anything to do with images.9
*
We conclude with some general reflections on the relations between delusion and
imagination. McGinn claims that, by seeing delusions as the products of imagery, we
better understand why they affect their subjects in ways different from ordinary beliefs.
Deluded subjects often seem to take a fictive or, as McGinn puts it, “melodramatic”
stance towards their delusions; they sometimes admit the implausibility and even the
impossibility of these ideas; they often make no or only a very limited attempt to
integrate their delusions with their other beliefs. McGinn says that this is because “the
source of the belief in the imagination is somehow registered in [the subject’s] mind”
(p.116). One need not accept the thesis that delusions have their basis in imagery in
order to think that this fictive aspect to delusions suggests a connection with the
imagination. As McGinn describes this aspect—“a flight away from the real world and
into a fictional world” (p.117)—it suggests that delusions are not beliefs at all, but
imaginings of some kind—presumably propositional or, as McGinn says, cognitive
imaginings.10 While one of us has argued exactly this thesis in the past, we suggest—
rather tentatively—a somewhat different view: that delusions considered as a class of
states do not fit easily into rigid categories of either belief or imagination. While delusions
generally have a significant power to command attention and generate affect, they vary
a great deal in the extent to which they are acted upon and given credence by their
possessors.11 In that case it may be that cognitive states do not sort themselves neatly
into categorically distinct classes we should label ‘beliefs’ and  ‘imaginings’, but that
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 See Campbell, J. (2001). ‘Rationality, meaning and the analysis of delusion’. Philosophy,
Psychiatry, and Psychology 8(2/3): 89-100 (p.96).
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 Louis Sass has argued that schizophrenic patients hold delusions ‘with … a certain distance or
irony’. The Paradoxes of Delusion (Cornell University Press: 1994): 21. For an elaboration of the
idea that delusions involve a fictive stance and an attempt to integrate this with cognitive theories
of schizophrenia, see Currie, G. and Jureidini, J. (2003). ‘Art and delusion’. The Monist, 86: 556-
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 For the claim that delusions are imaginings see Currie, G. (2000). ‘Imagination, hallucination
and delusion’ Mind and Language 15(1): 124-138. For criticism see Bayne, T. and Pacherie, E.
(2005). ‘In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions’. Mind and Language 20(2): 163-88.
7
Currie and Jones: On McGinn on delusions
31/03/2006
these categories represent vague clusterings in a space that encompasses a continuum
of states for some of which we have no commonly accepted labels.12
McGinn might not disagree with us about the diversity of states we confront: ‘belief’ he
says, is a term that covers states of different kinds, and we should not try to assimilate
everything it covers to one narrowly philosophical conception (p.112). Yet insisting they
all be called ‘beliefs’ seems to us a mistake, when among them are states--some kinds
of delusions, for instance--where ‘belief’ does not seem a more appropriate label than
‘imagining’. However we use the labels, we need to keep sight of important distinctions
between these states in terms of their motivating power, their causal origins, their
capacity to generate conviction. This requires a set of distinctions finer than the ones
philosophers have been used to employ.
Delusions may not be the only states that live in this puzzlingly indeterminate realm.
Consider the argument of Georges Rey for what he calls meta-atheism, the view that
many scientifically educated people who claim to believe the tenets of some religion are
mistaken and do not believe any such thing.13 Rey notices, among other things, the oddly
fictional characteristics of many religious stories, so often populated by characters
whose behaviour, impressive within the context of the story, would mark them, in real
life, to be avoided at all costs--think of the Old Testament prophets. If one accepts Rey’s
arguments, where in the cognitive universe should we say that the ideas (a conveniently
general term) of the educated theist lie? Simply to call them imaginings does not do
justice to their capacity to generate commitment and sacrifice. Perhaps some of what we
call belief in religion, magic and the spiritual also belongs in the more thinly populated
parts of cognitive space, between the clusters more appropriately marked ‘belief’ and
‘imagination’.14
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 Much ordinary, nonphilosophical use of these terms suggests a continuum view of the
relationship between belief and imagination. See also the account of 'in between believings' in
Schwitzgebel, E. (2001). ‘In-between believing’. Philosophical Quarterly  51: 76-82.
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 See Rey, G. ‘Meta-atheism: religious avowals as self-deception’, in R. Martin and D. Kolak
(Eds.) The Experience of Philosophy 6th Edition) (Oxford University Press: 2005).
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